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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CONTRACTS HELD
CONTROLLING IN AN ACTION ON A
PHYSICIAN'S CONTRACT FOR A
PARTICULAR RESULT
Noel v. Proud
189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961)
In an action by a patient against a physician, the Supreme Court
of Kansas' held that where the petition alleged a breach of an express
warranty as the basis of recovery of damages, 2 a valid cause of action
sounding in contract, governed by the three-year contract statute of limita-
tions, is stated. The issue decided was whether the petition stated a good
cause of action sounding in contract or one where the gravamen was in
tort for malpractice. The statute of limitations would have barred the
latter but not the former.3
The plaintiff's petition stated "that defendant undertook to treat
plaintiff and agreed to perform such an operation on the hearing structures
of each of plaintiff's ears and at the same time orally agreed and warranted
that while the operations might not have any beneficial effect the plaintiff's
hearing would not be worsened as a result of the operations . . . . and
that in reliance on and in consideration of the defendant's promises and
warranties plaintiff agreed to accept defendant's services and to pay the
reasonable cost therefor; ... That as a direct result of the breach of contract
by the defendant and the resultant loss of hearing in plaintiff's ears, plain-
tiff has been damaged. . .. -4 The majority cited an 1870 Kansas decision5
establishing the rule that a practicing physician or surgeon is not considered
as warranting a cure, unless under a special contract for such purpose.;
The court carefully distinguished 7 an action for malpractice, which is
based upon warranties and obligations implied by law because of the
1 Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961).
2 The damages in actions upon special contracts between physician and patient
are usually limited to those of a contract nature and do not include tort damages such
as pain and suffering, etc. Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
See generally 2 N.Y.L.F. 121 (1956); 31 St. John's L. Rev. 123 (1956); 7 Syracuse L.
Rev. 165 (1955). But cf. 21 NACCA L.J. 132 (1961).
3 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 60-306 (1949).
4 Noel v. Proud, supra note 1, at 63-64. Note that no allegations of negligence were
made concerning the conduct of the appellant-physician.
5 Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46 (1870).
6 See generally, 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 103 (1942); 70 C.J.S.
Physicians and Surgeons § 37 (1951) ; Annot., 27 A.L.R. 1250 (1923).
7 In the syllabus the court stated "Malpractice is predicated upon the failure to
exercise requisite medical skill and is tortious in nature, while an action in contract is
based upon a failure to perform a special agreement. Negligence, the basis of the one,
is foreign to the other."
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special nature of a contract of employment between patient and physician,8
from an action upon a special contract between patient and physician for a
particular resultY
In an earlier case, Becker v. Floersch,10 the petition alleged that defend-
ant guaranteed to cure a tumorous growth, and the court in discussing the
appropriate statute of limitations adopted as dictum this quotation from
plaintiff's brief: ". . [A]s this court has said many times, a malpractice
suit is a tort action and this court has swept aside in suits of this type,
the question of implied or explicit written or oral contract considerations
between patient and doctor."" Despite the fact that the defendant in the
instant case cited the dictum in Becker as prevailing authority in Kansas
that in patient-physician lawsuits the substance of the action was to prevail
over its form,12 the court held that a cause of action based upon a special
contract between physician and patient is controlled by the statute of limi-
tations for contracts not in writing rather than the shorter statute con-
trolling malpractice actions. Thus, as to statute of limitations issues in
Kansas, the mandate that the substance of the action (ex delicto) prevails
over its form (ex contractu) is now limited to causes of action brought on
an express or implied contract of employment for the improper performance
by a physician of those duties imposed upon him by reason of the profes-
sional services undertaken and not to actions based upon a physician's
special contract for a particular result.3
Even when statutes of limitations have been couched in similar lan-
guage, three different views may be distinguished as to whether an action
ex contractu by a patient for a breach of duty arising out of a physician's
contract of employment is governed by the time limitations provided by
tort (malpractice) actions or by time limitations provided for contract
actions. 14 Irrespective of such conflicting views, the issue presented in Noel,
whether the contract statute of limitations should apply where the act
alleged is a breach of the specific terms of a contract agreeing to perfect
a particular result, without any reference to legal duties imposed by law
in the relationship created thereby, is a separate legal question. The decision
in Noel gives weight to a growing trend of decisions, but there are cases
holding in effect that time limitations provided for tort actions control
8 Note that the obligation implied by law, that the physician use the average
degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of the profession practicing in
the same or similar locality, may result from either an express of implied contract of
employment or from a consensual relationship.
9 Accord, Robins v. Finestone, supra note 2; Calvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9,
92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949). See generally Annot., So A.L.R.2d 320, § 7 (1961); Miller,
"The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons," 1953 Wash. U.L.Q. 411.
10 153 Kan. 374, 110 P.2d 752 (1941).
11 Id. at 376, 110 P.2d at 754.
12 Traves v. Bishoff, 143 Kan. 283, 54 P.2d 955 (1936).
13 Noel v. Proud, supra note 1.
14 See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 323 (1961).
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malpractice actions, even though it is alleged in the complaint that the
defendant practitioner agreed to effect a cure or warranted that a particular
result would be obtained.15
Sales v. Tauber16 is the only Ohio case which specifically centers upon
the issue present in Noel. In Sales the Common Pleas Court of Hamilton
County ruled that an action against a physician for alleged breach of
warranty that an operation would leave no permanent after-effects is
in reality a suit for malpractice rather than an action for breach of contract,
and is barred in one year after the termination of the physician-patient
relationship. Yet, upon inspection of the Sales opinion, it appears that the
court did not address itself to the distinction between an action brought
on a physician's duties arising from a contract of employment and an action
upon a special contract to perfect a specific result.
The Ohio courts seem to recognize the rule that in the absence of a
special contract, a physician or surgeon is not an insurer, guarantor, or
warranter of recovery or a special result.17 There appears to be no authority
in Ohio restricting the making of such a contract by a physician and his
patient. Yet, it appears that Ohio Revised Code section 2305.11,18 the
statute of limitations applicable to malpractice actions, would also be
applicable to such special contracts for a particular result. In applying
an Ohio Supreme Court ruling "that a special statutory provision which
relates to the specific subject matter involved in litigation is controlling over
a general statutory provision which might otherwise be applicable,"' 9 the
court in Cox v. Cartwright2 ° ruled that "when the Legislature used the word
'malpractice' ... , the word was intended to refer to the nature of the subject
matter thereof, and not to its form as a matter of remedial procedure; and,
whether the action is strictly in tort or for breach of contract, it is nonethe-
less an action to recover damages for malpractice ... "21
The Supreme Court of Ohio has apparently approved of the Cox ap-
15 It has been held that a physician's malpractice liability insurance policy may
not insure against the breach of a special contract for a particular result. See Safian v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 260 App. Div. 765, 24 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1940), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 649, 36
N.E.2d 692 (1941); McGee v. United States F. & G. Co., 53 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1931).
See generally 10 Brooklyn L. Rev. 411 (1941).
16 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 372 (1929).
17 See Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902); Craig v. Chambers,
17 Ohio St. 253 (1867); Davish v. Am, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 646 (Ct. App. 1940); Morning-
star v. Jones, 31 Ohio L. Abs. 440 (Ct. App. 1940).
18 Note that while the Ohio statute which controls malpractice cases, Ohio Rev.
Code § 2305.11, specifically uses the word malpractice, the Kansas statute applicable,
G.S. 1949, 60-306 is worded, "... an action for injury to the rights of another, not
arising on contract ... ."
19 Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47, 50, 97 N.E.2d 549, 550
(1951).
20 96 Ohio App. 245, 121 N.E.2d 673 (1953).
21 Id. at 249, 121 N.E.2d at 676.
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proach,22 yet in Corpman v. Boyer,23 an action by a husband against a
physician for loss of consortium and services of his wife injured by the
alleged malpractice of the physician, the court held "that whether or not
plaintiff's claim 'grew out' of defendant's malpractice, we conclude that
by no stretch of the imagination can plaintiff's cause of action be 'for mal-
practice'. '24 Even though Corpman25 permits a cause of action which
results from the "subject matter" of a patient-physician relationship to be
brought not in one year but rather in four years, the cause of action sued
upon is distinct from any cause of action the patient may have had.26
In the Corpman and Klema27 cases, the Ohio court, even though it
extended the limitations period beyond that for "malpractice" in actions
based upon professional services rendered by a physician, restricted the
principle to cases where the plaintiff's cause of action is separable in the
res judicata sense from that of the patient. Although the Kansas court, on
the theory of special contract, permitted a patient's cause of action to
elude the restrictions of the malpractice statute of limitations, it thus appears
in Ohio that any cause of action brought against a physician by a plaintiff
who was a party to the patient-physician relationship would be barred by
the one-year malpractice statute of limitations2 Such a result seems prob-
able in Ohio even though the Kansas court, when faced with dictum similar
in nature to that in Cox, distinguished for statute of limitations purposes
an action upon a physician's contract for a particular result from an action
in tort.
Several policy arguments may be advanced which support the apparent
22 Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 521, 166
N.E.2d 765, 767 (1960).
23 171 Ohio St. 233, 169 N.E.2d 14 (1960).
24 The issue in Corpman v. Boyer, supra note 23, was whether Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2305.11, the malpractice statute of limitations, or Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.09, the
four-year period for commencement of certain actions not otherwise limited, was ap-
plicable. There was no contention that the action could be based upon any form of
contractual relationship.
25 For a case holding that an action for wrongful death allegedly caused by the
negligence of the hospital staff anesthetist, which alleged negligent act would have, if
death had not ensued, entitled the decedent to maintain an action for malpractice, was
governed by the two-year statute of limitations governing actions for malpractice, see
Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, supra note 22.
26 Had the wife (patient) in Corpman brought an action which resulted in an
adverse judgment, the husband's action for injuries to his wife would not have been
barred as res judicata. See 12 W. Res. L. Rev. 565 (1961); 6 Vill. L. Rev. 422 (1961).
27 Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Youngstown, supra note 22.
28 In Andrianos v. Community Traction Co., supra note 19, the Ohio court recog-
nized but one form of action, known as the civil action, and held that cases from other
states which turn upon a distinction in the form of action brought are not pertinent.
Note that this reasoning does not apply to causes of action resulting from the patient-
physician relationship, but which are separate in the res judicata sense from a cause of
action brought by the patient.
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Ohio position.29 The first, as illustrated by the numerous malpractice
statutes, is the strong tendency of many legislatures to cut down the extent
of liability of physicians and surgeons. Such a legislative purpose must be
expected to carry much weight with the courts. Secondly, it may be reasoned
that contracts to heal and cure do not truly belong to the family of mercan-
tile agreements which are the raison d'etre of the longer period of limita-
tions.30 It can further be asserted that in cases similar to Noel, the physician
either was careless or gave bad medical advice and thus may have been
guilty of that degree of negligence amounting to malpractice. 31 Despite
allegations of warranty, from a practical standpoint such acts as those in
Noel may not sufficiently differ from those negligent acts (torts) which do
not meet the required standard of medical care of the locality to grant them
separate contract statute of limitation treatment. 32 It would appear to be
the intent in enacting statutes of limitation which specifically mention "mal-
practice" that the statute apply to all actions resulting from a physician's
conduct which do not meet the requisite standard of medical care in the
locality. Thus, if a negligent act is the basis of an action against a physician
by his patient, it would appear that the courts in applying an appropriate
statute of limitations, should look toward the substance of the action rather
than to a mere distinction in the form of the action brought.
29 For a general discussion of statutes of limitation, see Callahan, "Statutes of
Limitations Background," 16 Ohio St. L.J. 130 (1955).
30 Miller, supra note 9, at 431.
31 Noel v. Proud, suprd note 1, at 67 (separate opinion).
32 Some states have passed statutes of limitations which specifically control all
actions by patients against physicians. See, e.g., Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-627 (Burns 1946).
